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THE NORTHERN CAMEROONS CASE
IN 1.961, the Federal Republic of Cameroon filed an application
with the International Court of Justice, requesting the Court to
declare that the United Kingdom, in its administration of the North-
ern Cameroons, had violated certain articles of a trusteeship agree-
ment.' Jurisdiction was grounded upon article 19 of this agreement
which provided that in the event of a dispute between a member of
the United Nations and the administering authority, the dispute
might be submitted to the International Court of Justice.2 On De-
cember 2, 1963, in announcing its decision on the preliminary ob-
jections, the Court declined to proceed further in the case because
it considered that the proper limits of its judicial function did not
permit an adjudication upon the merits of Cameroon's claim.8 The
decision raises interesting questions concerning the scope and nature
of the Court's jurisdiction under the International Trusteeship
System.4 Of more immediate significance, however, is the World
I Northern Cameroons Case, [1963] I.C.J. Rep. 15, at 17 [hereinafter cited as
Cameroons Case]. In its application, the Republic of Cameroon also alleged that the
United Kingdom had violated a United Nations General Assembly resolution. In its
final submission, however, Cameroon complained only that the United Kingdom had
failed to "respect certain obligations directly or indirectly flowing from the said
[trusteeship] Agreement, and in particular from Articles 3, 5, 6 and 7 thereof." Id.
at 20. Articles 3, 6 and 7 provided that the United Kingdom would administer the
trusteeship territory so as to achieve, in collaboration with the General Assembly and
Trusteeship Council, the basic objectives of the trusteeship system as stated in article
76 of the United Nations Charter, including the political advancement of the trust
territory's inhabitants. On the other hand, the United Kingdom was given full
governmental powers over the trust territory, and, significantly, as will be seen later,
was entitled, under article 5, to "constitute the Territory into a customs, fiscal or ad-
ministrative union or federation with adjacent territory under his sovereignty or
control, and to establish common services between such territories and the Territory
where such measures are not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the international
trusteeship system." U.N. Doc. No. T/8 (1947). See U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91.
2 Cameroons Case at 25. "Article 19. If any dispute whatever should arise between
the Administering Authority and another Member of the United Nations relating to
the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement, such dispute,
if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other means, shall be submitted to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, provided for in Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter."
Ibid. See also U.N. Doc. No. T/8 (1947); [1946-1947] I.C.J.Y.B. 230.
3 Cameroons Case at 88. The Court's vote was ten to five. One permanent judge
took no part in the case. The fifteenth judge was M. Beb a Don, Ambassador of
Cameroon to France. Cameroon appointed him as judge ad hoc pursuant to article
31(2) of the Court's statute, which provides: "If the Court includes upon the Bench
a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person
to sit as judge." Judge Fitzmaurice, of British nationality, was a member of the Court.
I For a discussion of some of these questions see notes 18-21 infra.
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Court's full statement of the essentials of its judicial function and its
determination to guard carefully its judicial integrity in contentious
as well as advisory proceedings. To comprehend the basis for and
implications of the decision, it will be necessary, as the Court itself
did, to trace briefly the history and background of the dispute.5
On December 13, 1946, the Cameroons previously administered
by Britain and France under the League of Nations Mandates Sys-
tem, were placed under the United Nations International Trustee-
ship System.6 Britain continued to administer two areas, known as
the Southern and Northern Cameroons, which lay contiguous to
and east of the British Protectorate of Nigeria.7  The Northern
r The Court looked primarily to proceedings within the United Nations, particular-
ly those of the Trusteeship Council, the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship) of the
General Assembly, and the General Assembly itself. In addition the Court referred to
special reports submitted to the United Nations by its Visiting Mission to West
Africa, by the U.N. Plebiscite Commissioner in the Cameroons, and by the Administer-
ing Authority.
GDecember 13 was the date upon which the U.N. General Assembly approved
the trusteeship agreement. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rc. 1st Sess., Plenary 62 (A/258)
(1946). Though chapters XII and XIII of the U.N. Charter describe the scope, aims
and terms of the International Trusteeship System, the administering authority must
make a separate agreement for each trusteeship, setting forth the specific terms under
which each territory is to be administered. The trusteeship agreement becomes effec-
tive upon its approval by the U.N. General Assembly. U.N. CHARTER arts. 75, 77, 81,
85. See KELSEN, THE LAW oF THE UNITED NATIONS 570-609 (1950).
As a German protectorate, Cameroons had originally been a single entity. How-
ever, in 1919, Germany renounced all right and title to its overseas possessions under
article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles. The administration of the Cameroons was
then divided between Britain and France and placed under the Mandates System of
the League of Nations. Cameroons Case at 21. Upon the dissolution of the League
in April 1946, Britain and France chose to place the mandates under the United
Nations trusteeship system. See U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 1 (a).
The International Trusteeship System carries forward the main principles and
purposes of the Mandates System; thus Britain's administrative arrangements for the
Cameroons continued much the same as before. However, the two systems differ in
that the United Nations has been able to exert somewhat broader supervisory powers
over the trusteeships. This in large part is due to the enhanced stature of the United
Nations over the League in world affairs, and to the strong movement, since 1945,
toward independence and self-government among dependent peoples. Among the im-
portant institutional differences between the Mandates and the Trusteeships is the
United Nations' right to visit trust territories with the administering authority's con-
sent. Visiting missions have thus visited most of the trust areas every three years
and from their findings have come recommendations and consequently the initiative
for reforms and steps toward independence. Sayre, Legal Problems Arising from the
United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 265, 267 (1948). See also
TOUssAINT, Tim TRUSTmSIP SySTm OF THE UNITED NATIONS 60-61, 171-80, 195-99
(1956). It was a U.N. Visiting Mission's report which led to recommendations for
the plebiscites in the British Cameroons. Report of the Visiting Mission on the
Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, U.N. Doe. No. T/1426 (1958).
Concerning the Trusteeship System generally, and the extent to which it differs from
the Mandates System, see Sayre, supra at 265, and TOUSSAINT, op. cit. supra.
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Cameroons was divided into two sections,8 each one being admin-
istered as an integral part of Nigeria.9 This administrative arrange-
ment forms the main source of the present dispute between the
Republic of Cameroon and the United Kingdom. Cameroon, which
until its independence on January 1, 1960, comprised the French
portion of the Cameroons Trusteeship, claimed that in not ruling
the Northern Cameroons as a single entity separately from Nigeria,
Britain irreparably prejudiced the future political status of the area
in controvention of the trusteeship agreement. Until May, 1961,
Cameroon confined its dispute to discussions within the political
organs of the United Nations.' 0 In 1959, before the dispute arose
in the United Nations, the General Assembly had recommended
that a plebiscite be held in order to ascertain whether the inhabi-
tants of the British Cameroons wished to join Nigeria or Cam-
eroon." In a plebiscite subsequently held in February, 1961 under
United Nations auspices, a majority of the inhabitants of the North-
ern Cameroons voted freely and secretly to join permanently with
Nigeria. 12 Despite Cameroon's criticisms of the United Kingdom's
administration, the results of the plebiscite were endorsed by the
United Nations General Assembly which voted to end the trustee-
ship agreement on June 1, 1961 .13 With the United Kingdom's
"These sections, consisting of two elongated triangles stretching southward from
Lake Chad in the north, were separated by a portion of Nigeria forty-five miles in
width. See maps in U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Annexes, vol. 1, at 86 (1960-
1961).
9 The Court itself refrained from saying that the Northern Cameroons was admin-
istered as an "integral" part of Nigeria. The United Kingdom and the United Nations
Plebiscite Commissioner, however, gave this description of the administrative arrange-
ment. THE CAMEROONS UNDER UNITED KINGDOM ADMINISTRATION. REPORT BY UNITED
KINGDOM TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (1958); Report of United
Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscite in the Cameroons, U.N.
Doc. No. T/1491 and Corr. 1, Add. 1 (1959).
1" As Cameroon did not achieve independence until 1960 and did not become a
member of the United Nations until September of that year, it had a relatively short
time in which to develop its objections since the U.N. General Assembly voted in
April, 1961, to end the trusteeship and to allow the Northern Cameroons to become
part of Nigeria. France, however, had made Cameroon's complaints known in May,
1960. Cameroons Case at 24.
7.U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 14th Sess., Plenary 857 (A/4354) (1959).
"
2 Report of United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, U.N. Doc. No. T/1556/Ap-
pendix and Add. 1 & 2 (1961). Cameroons Case at 23-25.
I8 Ibid. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary 995 (A/4738) (1961). In a
"White Book" circulated among all U.N. members, Cameroon set forth its objections
to the United Kingdom's administration, claiming that "failure to separate the ad-
ministrations of the two territories destroyed an essential guarantee of impartiality
and effectively sabotaged the plebiscite . . . . The only acceptable solution to avoid
a monstrous injustice. . . is to declare the plebiscite... null and void .... " Came-
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approval, the trusteeship ended on that date and the Northern Cam-
eroons became part of Nigeria.14 On May 30, 1961, two days before
the trusteeship agreement expired, the Republic of Cameroon filed
its application with the International Court of Justice.15
The Court dealt first with the preliminary objection raised by
the United Kingdom that the Court had no jurisdiction under
article 19 of the trusteeship agreement, since no "dispute" existed
between itself and the Republic of Cameroon.16 If any dispute
existed, declared the United Kingdom, it was between Cameroon
and the United Nations General Assembly.17 The Court rejected
this and another objection upon principles well-settled in the Court's
jurisprudence, and thus little significance attaches to this phase of
the proceeding.'8 However, the Court never determined decisively
Toons Case at 31-32. See also the Fourth Committee debates of April, 1961, prior to
the U.N. General Assembly approval of the plebiscite. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC., 15th
Sess., 4th Comm. 294-385 (A/CA/SR 1141-53) (1961).
11 With the exception of that pertaining to Italian Somaliland, the U.N. trustee-
ship agreements contained no provisions for their termination. For this reason the
legal arrangements by which they would be terminated were at first in doubt. Sayre,
supra note 7, at 288-90. The International Court in the instant case confirmed the
General Assembly's practice of terminating the agreements by resolution, and in doing
so suggested that General Assembly resolutions have important legal effect. See text
at 556-58 infra.
'1"The Republic of Cameroon, as a Member of the United Nations .. .had a
right to apply to the Court and by the filing of the Application of 30 May 1961 the
Court was seised." Cameroons Case at 29. Cameroon had tried but failed to persuade
the United Kingdom to submit the issue to the International Court by special agree-
ment. The United Kingdom maintained that Cameroon's grievance was with the
United Nations, an argument which was pursued as a preliminary objection in the
case. Id. at 25. See also text accompanying note 17 infra.
20 Cameroons Case at 20.
27 Id. at 27.
2" As to the question of a dispute the Court merely observed: "In the view of the
Court it is sufficient to say that, having regard to the facts already stated in this
Judgment, the opposing views of the Parties as to the interpretation and application
of relevant Articles of the Trusteeship agreement, reveal the existence of a dispute in
the sense recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court and of its predecessor ...."
Id. at 27. The Permanent Court of International Justice defined a "dispute" as a
"disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between
two persons." Mavrommatis Concessions Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 11 (1924).
The present Court has said: "Whether there exists an international dispute is a
matter for objective determination" and a dispute exists if a situation has arisen "in
which the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the perform-
ance or non-performance of certain treaty obligations." Interpretation of Peace
Treaties Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, at 74. More recently, interpreting a jurisdictional
clause very similar to the one in the Cameroons Case, the Court took a broad view
of the meaning of the phrase "any dispute whatever." South West Africa Cases,
[1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319, at 343. See note 2 supra.
The other objection related to a question of pleading. Rule 32 (2) of the Court
provides that: "[T]he application must ... indicate .. . the subject of the dispute.
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.whether it had jurisdiction to entertain Cameroon's complaint.10
Had its competence been established, the Court might have found
that both it and the United Nations General Assembly had concur-
rent jurisdiction over the same subject matter.20  Though the sepa-
rate opinions of four Judges suggest that the Court had no jurisdic-
tion in this case,21 the Court avoided this sensitive question by first
It must also, as far as possible, specify the provision on which the applicant founds
the jurisdiction of the Court, state the precise nature of the claim and give a succinct
statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is based." The Court
considered that Cameroon had complied with these requirements, bearing in mind
the phrase "as far as possible," and the fact that "'the Court, whose jurisdiction is
international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of impor-
tance which they might possess in municipal law.'" Cameroons Case at 27-28, citing
Mavrommatis Concessions Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 84 (1924).
1 The reason for this was that the Court declined to decide several of the objec-
tions to its jurisdiction. In their pleadings, the parties made frequent references to
the South West African Cases, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319, since the jurisdictional clause
involved in those cases was substantially the same as that involved in the Catncroons
Case, (article 19, supra note 2) and in the former cases the Court had accepted juris-
diction. The preferred rule of treaty construction, applied in the South West Africa
Case, is the "natural and ordinary meaning" rule whereby the words of a treaty are
read in their natural and ordinary sense, without reference to extraneous sources, in
order to discover the intention of the parties. In view of this preference and its
application to a jurisdictional clause not significantly different from article 19, it
would seem that the Court would have had jurisdiction in the Cameroons Case. See
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPFENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
49-60 (1958); Fitzmaurice, Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, 3 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 203 (1957). This
reasoning seems to have influenced the four dissenting judges, who argued that the
Court did have jurisdiction in this case. See, e.g., the dissent of Judge lustamante,
who could see no distinction between the two jurisdictional clauses. Cameroons Case
154-183. Four of the majority ,of the Court disagreed, however, and set forth their
arguments against this view in separate opinions. See note 21 infra.
.o The Court does not foreclose such a possibility. It observed, however, that if it
was competent to adjudicate the dispute, and make a finding of a breach of law, such
a finding "might lead the General Assembly to do whatever it thought useful or
desirable in the light of the judgment pronounced as between a Member of the
United Nations and an Administering Authority for the territory in question."
Cameroons Case at 34-35.2 1 Judge Spender, with whom Judge Fitzmaurice agreed, would give article 19 of
the trusteeship agreement a restrictive interpretation. Cf. note 19 supra. He felt that
there were inherent differences between the Mandates System and the International
Trusteeship System such that the parties to the agreement could not have intended
that the Court should have jurisdiction over disputes of this nature. The Court's
jurisdiction, he said, was confined to the two articles of the agreement whereby U.N.
members were granted certain legal rights in regard to the trusteeship territory, such
as equal treatment in social, economic, industrial and commercial matters (arts. 9
and 11). Cameroons Case 65-96, 111-130. Judge Wellington Koo looked closely at
article 19 and observed that a dispute could only be brought to the Court "if it
cannot be settled by negotiations or other means." Since the General Assembly had
heard the dispute and decided to end the trusteeship, the dispute had been settled
by "other means," hence the Court had no jurisdiction. Cameroons Case 50-64. Judge
Morelli in his separate opinion considered that the Court lacked jurisdiction since
the dispute submitted was npt. a dispute "relating to the interpretation or applica.
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considering the propriety of engaging its function and by finding
reasons for dismissal on this ground.22
The basis for this refusal to adjudicate on the merits was founded
in the Court's concern in preserving its judicial integrity. It estab-
lished first that the right to determine the limitations on the exercise
of judicial function rested with the Court:
There are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial func-
tion which the Court, as a court of justice, can never ignore. There may
thus be an incompatibility between the desires of an applicant, or indeed,
of both parties to a case, on the one hand, and on the other hand the
duty of the Court to maintain its judicial character. The Court itself,
and not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial integ-
rity.2
3
The Court supported this statement with earlier cases in which it
had declined to proceed to judgment although endowed with juris-
diction to do so, for example, because the parties had agreed in
advance not to be bound by the decision, or because the questions
posed could not be answered by the application of legal rules.2
tion" of the provisions of the trusteeship agreement within the meaning of article 19.
Id. at 131-49.
22Judge Koretsky, dissenting, objected to this procedure. He argued that a ques-
tion of jurisdiction must, according to the rules of the Court, be decided before reach-
ing what he termed the "admissibility" (propriety?) of a claim. By not following
this procedure the Court here, he felt, had decided the merits of the claim before
deciding the jurisdictional question. Cameroons Case 39-40. Judge Fitzmaurice's
answer to this point was that "there would clearly be an element of absurdity in the
Court going through all the motions of establishing its jurisdiction, if it considered
it must then in any event decline to examine the claim on this ground [propriety]."
Id. at 105; see also id. at 100-08. See ROSENNE, Tim INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
256, 460 (1957); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice 1951-54; Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, 34 BrT. Y1.
INT'L L. 1, 21-22 (1958).
The Court itself adopted a flexible approach: "The answer to the question whether
the judicial function is engaged may, in certain cases where the issue is raised, need
to wait upon an examination of the merits. In the present case, however, it is already
evident that it cannot be engaged. No purpose accordingly would be served by under-
taking an examination of the merits of the case for the purpose of reaching a decision
which, in the light of the circumstances to which the Court has already called atten-
tion, ineluctably must be made." Cameroons Case at 38.
-. Cameroons Case at 29.
21 Id. at 29-31. The Court cited the Free Zones Case, P.G.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46
(1932) where the parties had agreed beforehand to accept only certain constructions
of a treaty, thus limiting the Court's range of choice. Also cited was the Haya de la
Torre Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 71, in which the Court refused to choose the manner
in which the asylum should be terminated since the "choice ... could not be based
on legal considerations, but only on considerations of practicability or of political
expediency; it is not part of the Court's judicial function to make, such a choice." Id.
at 79.
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Though these previous decisions are distinguishable from the situa-
tion presented in the instant case, the general principle they embody
is pertinent. They confirm the right of the Court to refuse to en-
gage its judicial function when in its discretion it considers it im-
proper to do so. Although this rule has never been doubted, 26 it
is only with respect to advisory opinions that the statute and rules
of the Court explicitly grant such a discretionary power. 20
Having established its role as the guardian of its own judicial
integrity, the Court proceeded to describe the touchstones by which
it would be guided in determining the propriety or impropriety of
engaging its judicial function. It gave two reasons for not proceed-
ing further in the case. First, it examined the nature of the legal
question placed before it. The Republic of Cameroon did not ask
for reparation but merely sought a declaration that the United King-
dom had violated the trusteeship agreement.27 It did not ask the
Court to find a causal connection between the alleged violations
and the results of the plebiscite, and thus declare the plebiscite null
and void and the trusteeship agreement resuscitated. 28 Cameroon
conceded that the Court could not reverse the General Assembly's de-
cision to endorse the plebiscite and to terminate the agreement. 20
This admission was neither explicitly approved nor disapproved by
2 See, e.g., ROSENNE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 47, 65, 256, 460; Fitzmaurice, supra
note 22, at 21-22. Both writers cite the Monetary Gold Case, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 19, as
authority. The Court did not mention this case, but cited the Eastern Carelia Case,
P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5 (1923). Both cases are similar since, in each, the Court refused
to proceed to the merits because some third nation, not subject to the Court's jurisdic-
tion, was a necessary party to the suit.
2 6Article 65 (1) of the statute of the Court provides: "The Court may give an
advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such
a requesL" In the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, the
Court stated: "Article 65 of the Statute is permissive. It gives the Court the power
to examine whether circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead
it to decline to the answer the Request." Id. at 72. See Cheng, The Scope and Limits
of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice-I, 24 TuE SOLICITOR
187, 188 (1957); Sloan, Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 38
CALm'. L. Rxv. 830 (1950).
27 Cameroons Case at 31-32. Cameroon could not have asked for reparation. See
note 39 infra.
28 The absence of such a request was clearly inconsistent with the objections raised
by Cameroon in the United Nations political organs. See note 13 supra. The Court
noted the inconsistency. Cameroons Case at 31-33.
29 "But the Applicant has stated that it does not ask the Court to invalidate the
plebiscite; indeed as noted, it recognizes the Court could not do so. It has not asked
the Court to find any causal connection between the alleged maladministration and
the result of the vote favouring union with the Federation of Nigeria." Caincroons
Case at 33.
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the Court. Several highly significant statements of the Court seem
to establish, however, that a General Assembly resolution can have
legally binding effect and hence is not reviewable by the Court. It
stated that there was neither any doubt nor in fact any controversy,
that the General Assembly resolution approving the plebiscite and
terminating the trusteeship agreements had "definitive legal effect,"
although General Assembly resolutions are usually only recommen-
dations, and are not legally binding upon United Nations mem-
bers.30
But due to the peculiarities of this case, it is arguable, upon
either of two theories, that the General Assembly resolution had a
legally binding effect. First, the two parties whose consent was
necessary to amend or terminate the trusteeship agreement were
the United Kingdom and the U.N. General Assembly. It may there-
fore be argued that since both these parties approved the resolution
endorsing the plebiscite and recommending that the trusteeship be
terminated, the resolution amounted to a definitive agreement be-
tween the United Kingdom and the General Assembly to terminate
the trusteeship. Agreements by the contracting parties to terminate
international conventions certainly have definitive legal effect.
Secondly, it may be argued that the U.N. General Assembly can
unilaterally end a trusteeship agreement by reason of its general
supervisory power over the trusteeship system.3 ' If the General As-
sembly considered that the basic objectives of the trusteeship, as set
forth in article 76 (b) of the United Nations Charter, had been
achieved, there would be no longer any reason for the trust. In
addition, if it was argued that the administering authority's consent
was legally indispensable to the termination of the trust, then the
administering authority could continue to rule the trust territory
no matter when or for how long the objectives of the International
Trusteeship System had been achieved. Such a veto power would
be inconsistent with the purposes of the system and would under-
mine its effectiveness. Thus the General Assembly, representing the
general community interest, seemingly has the right to unilaterally
declare the trusteeship at an end. This view seems to be espoused
by the Court:
3Id. at 32. See KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 459.
81 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 75, 85.
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[T]he termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and the ensuing joinder
of the Northern Cameroons to the Federation of Nigeria were not the
acts of the United Kingdom but the result of actions of the General
Assembly, actions to which the United Kingdom assented.
82
In other words, the United Kingdom's approval was unnecessary
since, legally, the prime responsibility for terminating the trustee-
ship agreement rested with the General Assembly.8 3 In the light of
this reasoning, it is not surprising that the Court considered that
Cameroon's claim did not present a "concrete issue" for which a
legal remedy-was available. 4
Secondly, not only was the issue presented of purely academic
interest, but also any judgment rendered would have lacked effec-
tive application. This, too, militated against a judicial determina-
tion of Cameroon's claim:
[The court] may pronounce judgment only.., where there exists at
the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict
of legal interests between the parties. The Court's judgment must have
some practical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal
rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their
legal relations. No judgment on the merits in this case could satisfy
these essentials of the judicial function.8 5
The Court reinforced this statement of law later in the opinion by
observing that, though in certain cases it may render a declaratory
judgment, such a judgment must- have a continuing applicability
before judicial function will be engaged.8 6 Since the trust is ended,
32 Cameroons Case at 33.
11 But See KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 657; Gross, Limitations upon the judicial
Function, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 430 n.69 (1964).
31 "[T]he Court is relegated to an issue remote from reality" and "may pronounce
judgment only in connection with concrete cases ... ." Cameroons Case at 33.
35 Id. at 33-34.
'"'Id. at 36-37. judge Badawi, dissenting, urged that a declaratory judgment could
be given in this case. He argued that, in 'the Anglo-Saxon and North American legal
systems, the use of declaratory judgments has developed differently than in the Euro-
pean and international legal systems. Though effective application is essential in the
former systems, he stated, it is not considered so in continental and international law.
He cited the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 36, as authority for his view.
There the Court stated: "[Tjhe United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the
People's Republic of Albania, and . .. this declaration by the Court constitutes in
itself appropriate satisfaction." In Judge Badawi's opinion, 'this was a declaratory
judgment in the sense accepted in Europe, and recognized in international law in
proceedings before arbitral and other tribunals, and the case was almost identical
with the present one. Cameroons Case 150-53. Judge Badawi's views do not appear
well considered. See LAUTERPAcHT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 250-52; Gross, supra note
33, at 419-23.
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a declaration interpreting the meaning or application of its pro-
visions is pointless. In the terminology of American jurisprudence,
the question has been rendered "moot" by the termination of the
trust.3 7 Even if a judgment were rendered in Cameroon's favor it
could be given no effect since neither the United Kingdom nor the
United Nations had any authority over the Northern Cameroons
after July 1, 1961.38
In view of the termination of the trusteeship agreement before
the adjudication of the case, it is difficult to perceive how Cameroon
could have avoided the submission of a moot point. Furthermore,
the grounds upon which its particular claim were based precluded
any award of damages.8 9 Cameroon came to court too late. The
moment the General Assembly voted to end the trusteeship agree-
ment, the United Kingdom's liability for prior violations ceased for
all practical purposes, although from a narrow reading of the Court's
'17See, e.g., San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885); Mills
v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895). In the Mills case the Supreme Court observed: "The
duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies
by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
Affect the matter in issue in the case before it." Id. at 653. See also Note, 22 IND. L.J.
235 (1947).
38 Camreroons Case at 33-34. Under article 59 of the statute of the Court the judg-
ment would bind only parties to the suit; thus Nigeria would not be bound by the
decision. Ibid. Also, the Court indicated that: "Normally when the Court pronounces
a judicial condemnation there is room for the application of Article 94 of the [United
Nations] Charter. That is not the case here." Id. at 84. Article 94 of the Charter
provides that a member of the United Nations shall comply with the Court's judg-
ments in any case to which it is a party, and that if a party fails to comply, the
U.N. Security Council may take measures to give effect to the judgment.
"LThe Court does not explicitly state that Cameroon could not have sought
damages. However, in order to test certain contentions by the parties, the Court
stated that, assuming it had jurisdiction and that article 19 was designed to provide
a form of judicial protection in the particular interest of the territory's inhabitants,
it would follow that Cameroon had "a procedural right which was to be exercised in
the general interest, whatever may have been the material individual interest of the
Republic of Cameroon." Cameroons Case at 86. Since, after June 1, 1961, there was
no trust territory and no inhabitants for whose protection the trust functions could
be exercised, the substantive interest which Cameroon's "procedural right" was de-
signed to protect disappeared with the termination of the trusteeship agreement. Ibid.
The implication of this statement by the Court is that Cameroon's complaint was
based upon a legal right which it could exercise only in the general interest in order
to protect the trust territory's inhabitants, and which did not bestow- an individual
right upon Cameroon for harm which it might suffer. Ibid. Cf. South West Africa
Cases, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319, 335-42, 422-36. Not all claims arising out of the trustee-
ship agreement were liquidated by the termination of the agreement since certain
of its articles confer, in accordance with article 76 (d) of the U.N. Charter, individual
rights upon United Nations members. Cameroon's claim, however, was rot based
upon any of these articles. Cf. note 21 supra.
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reasoning, it appears that Cameroon's claim was not liquidated until
the actual termination of the trusteeship agreement.40 What the
Court's decision would have been, if at the time of adjudication the
General Assembly had voted to end the agreement but the termina-
tion had not yet occurred, must remain speculative.
41
The World Court's determination not to answer legal questions
unless essential to the disposition of the case demonstrates the cau-
tion and restraint with which it exercises its judicial function. 42 Its
effectiveness in fostering the growth of international law and the
judicial settlement of international disputes rests in the respect
which its decisions command. There are strong reasons for refrain-
ing from rendering a decision when it can have no legal effect but
instead may serve as an instrument for political dispute.43 Faced
squarely with the task of defining the limits of its own judicial func-
tion for the first time, the Court felt that a clear statement of the
essentials of this function was necessary. This statement serves as
reassurance to those who question the validity of the Court as a
court of law. By referring to its own case law as authority for its
power to refuse to engage its judicial function, the Court also empha-
sized that continuity and stability of legal principles underlie its
jurisprudence.44 The decision suggests that the Court is aware of its
,0 Concluding its hypothetical statement outlined in note 39 supra, the Court said:
"Accordingly, the Republic of Cameroon would not have had a right after 1 June
1961, when the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated and the Trust itself came to
an end, to ask the Court to adjudicate at this stage upon questions affecting the
rights of the inhabitants of the former Trust Territory .. a.." C meroons Case at 36,
"2The Court's reasoning relied primarily upon the actual termination of the
agreement. But it would appear, from the Court's statement that the General Assem-
bly's decision to terminate the trust had a definitive legal effect, that it was this
General Assembly resolution which rendered Cameroon's claim moot, not the termina-
tion of the trust.
'
2 Cf. LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 77-84.
43 This was probably one reason for Cameroon's desire for a judgment in its favor.
As Judge Wellington Koo pointed out: "The interest which the Republic of Cameroon
now claims to have cannot be of a legal character; it is only a political interest of its
own .... ." Cameroons Case at 46. The court itself observed: "But it is not the
function of a court merely to provide a basis for political action if no question of
actual legal right is involved." Id. at 37.
"4See SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 37-66 (1957). It should be pointed
out that the prior cases cited by the Court established as a general proposition only
the Court's right to define the limits of its judicial function. They did not set forth
any general definition of these limits but were restricted in their definition to the
facts stated therein. In the present case, the Court's broad statement of the essentials
of its judicial function can only have been derived by reference to "general principles
of law recognized by civilised nations." See STATUTE OF Tag COURT art. 38; Cheng,
The Scope and Limits of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice-l, 24 THE SOLICITOR 219, 220-22 (1957). The World Court was obviously
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important responsibility for encouraging acceptance of the judicial
process as a means of resolving international disputes. In taking the
approach it did, the Court tried not only to do justice in this
particular case, but also to render an opinion consonant with ac-
cepted standards of legal jurisprudence. Certainty of law and high
standards of judicial integrity are essential in predisposing nations
to accept the World Court's jurisdiction.45
conscious of the practice of municipal tribunals, and Judge Fitzmaurice, in referring
to the unique nature of Cameroon's claim, described it as "moot" in the sense given
to that term in United States legal terminology. Cameroons Case at 97 n.l. This
suggests, perhaps, one of the main sources of the World Court's statement of principle.
Cf. note 37 supra.
"For Governments have often manifested an inclination to make the scope of
obligatory jurisdiction conferred upon international tribunals dependent upon the
existence of dear rules of international law." LAUTE"RAcHT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 7.
